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Abstract: This paper investigates the contribution of public investment to the reduction of 
regional inequalities, with a specific application to Mexico. We use quantile regressions to 
examine the impact of public investment on regional disparities according to the position of 
each region in the conditional distribution of regional income. Results confirm the 
hypothesis that regional inequalities can indeed be attributed to the regional distribution of 
public investment, where the observed pattern shows that public investment mainly helped 
to reduce regional inequalities between the richest regions.  
JEL classification: R11, H50, C39  
Key words: regional development, public investment, quantile regression  
 
 
 
Resum:  Aquest article examina la contribució de la inversió pública en la reducció de les 
desigualats regionals, amb una aplicació específica Mèxic. Utilitzem la regressió quantílica 
per examinar l’impacte de la inversió pública en reduir les disparitats regional dependent de 
la posició de cada regió en la distribució condicional de la renda regional. Els resultants 
confirmen la hipòtesi pel la qual les desigualtats regional poden atribuir-se a la distribució 
de la inversió pública de manera que ha contribuït a reduir les desigualtats entre les regions 
més riques.  
 
 
  
1 Introduction 
In recent years regional policies have largely been characterised by a tendency to invest in 
infrastructure. These policies are justified by a number of authors on the grounds of positive 
efficiency gains that arise from the impact of public investment on regional economic growth 
(Aschauer, 1989;  Munnell, 1990a, 1990b; Gramlich, 1994; de la Fuente, 1996a; Fernald, 
1999). However there are also marked effects on the distribution of economic activity, and 
subsequently, on the generation of regional inequalities (de la Fuente, 1996b). Geography is 
important in determining economic activity within countries, and thus affecting the regional 
income distribution and the structure of production among space. Therefore, arguably 
regional policies might have a role in influencing the geography of economic activity in order 
to smooth regional disparities.  
 
The “hypothesis of regional redistribution” establishes that inequalities may decline as a 
result of a specific distribution of public investment designed to encourage regional 
convergence, whereby poor regions are intended to grow more than richer ones. Although the 
Structural Funds are not the unique source of public investment, evidence from the European 
Union (EU) shows that regional disparities have not decreased. Poorer regions have not 
grown faster than richer regions, and hence regional policies do not seem to have 
significantly influenced the decline of regional inequalities (Boldrin and Canova, 2001). A 
comprehensive explanation suggest that improvements in inter-regional infrastructures  
which are channelled through reductions in transaction costs, potentially discourage firms 
from localising in poor areas, which in itself may increase the regional income gap (Martin 
and Rogers, 1995 and Martin, 1999). Alternatively, Sala i Martin (1994) points out that 
empirical findings revealing similar convergence coefficients from growth models  between 
sufficiently heterogeneous regions can be interpreted as evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
regional investment policies in achieving redistribution goals. However, the equality of 
convergence coefficients across heterogeneous regions might still be the result of an 
insufficient redistribution effort (De la Fuente, 2001).We can conclude then, that the 
relationship between regional inequalities and public investment is still problematic and 
requires further attention.  
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 The new context of economic integration in North America and Europe has led to a 
reconsideration of the role of public investment as a way of smoothing out regional 
inequalities. Mexico has been taken as a paradigmatic example where to study the role of 
geography on economic activity. Indeed, Mexico has an estimated population of 100 million 
people in 2000 and is a federal state organised into 31 separate states (henceforth referred to 
as ‘regions’) plus Mexico City as is exhibited in Table A1 (in the appendix) . Interestingly, 
regional economic disparities in Mexico are important, with a developed north and large 
agglomeration economies in Mexico City. Although the federal government has ultimate 
control of regional funds, important differences exist across regions both in the allocation of 
public investment and in the number of federal programmes implemented.  
 
The geographical gradients of Latin American countries are dramatic, and Mexico is not an 
exception. In 1985 Mexico opened its economy to international trade which has lead to the 
development of new industry centres in  Northern Mexico. Typically, regions benefiting the 
most from regional integration arrangements either have prior advantages from economic 
agglomeration (Krugman and Livas, 1996), or productive and natural resource endowments. 
And, in the case where countries involved are sufficiently large and heterogeneous, economic 
activity might be the result of having rich neighbours. In Mexico examples of the latter would 
be the northern regions bordering the USA, and examples of the former the oil producing 
regions and the areas surrounding Mexico City. Mexico City because of its large skilled work 
force, consumer market, low distribution costs and proximity to government decision makers 
concentrated a large part of the economic activity. These has been argued to have lead to the 
breakdown of a regional wage gradient (Hanson, 1997). 
 
This paper explores the hypothesis that public investment displays a divergent influence on 
the distribution of regional income. We hypothesise that an assessment of the way income is 
regionally distributed could provide us with some insights. For instance, one might expect 
public investment to reduce inequalities solely in one set of (e.g., the richer) regions, whereas 
it might not be effective in the remaining set (e.g., the poorer regions). Unlike the previous 
literature, we employ quantile regressions to investigate the contribution of public investment 
at different points of the regional income distribution function. Furthermore, this study also 
questions whether different types of public investment have an equal influence on regional 
productivity, particularly in developing countries. That is, are specific sorts of public 
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investment (infrastructure or social investment) equally influential along the conditional 
regional distribution scale? Aschauer (1989) has shown that investment sources do matter in 
explaining regional income. When splitting public investment into different sources, 
infrastructure (or productive) investment appears to raise productivity considerably, whereas 
the effect of social investment is much less marked (Mas et al., 1996). The explanation for 
this effect might well be that social investment has an indirect influence through human 
capital accumulation instead of a short-run effect, while infrastructure investment plays a role 
in the short run in that it reduces transaction costs between regions. Moreover, following 
Martin (1999) a reduction in transaction costs would benefit the more dynamic regions, 
typically those in the upper quantile of regional income distribution. Therefore, the impact of 
infrastructure investment should be especially prominent in this group of regions. Finally, as 
highlighted in the title, we should stress the nature of the application setting. Studies based on 
middle income countries may reveal geographical specific patterns.  
 
We shall first provide an outline of the institutional setting, the evolution of regional 
disparities and the distribution of public investment in Mexico. Section 3 includes a 
discussion of the theoretical framework and a brief survey of literature. Section 4 describes 
the model and data. Results are discussed in Section 5, followed by conclusions in the final 
section.  
 
2 The role of public investment in economic performance 
The economic channels that explain the influence of public investment are central to our 
analysis. Public investment1 brings efficiency gains through economic growth, which in turn 
expands productive capacity and increases regional productivity. Infrastructure incorporates 
goods or activities which hypothetically increase private sector productivity. Furthermore, 
public (social) investment is believed to directly benefit demand as well by increasing the 
welfare of future generations and subsequently improving future productive capital. 
Nevertheless, these benefits occur mainly under two sets of circumstances. Firstly, when 
services provided respond efficiently to effective demand (World Bank, 1994), and secondly, 
                                                 
1 Public investment can comprise diverse concepts. It is mainly divided into two categories (World Bank 1994; 
Hansen 1965): economic investment, which includes transport, communication and related issues; and social 
investment, which includes education, health, ecology, etc. 
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where the existence of high externalities prevents private investors from financing goods and 
services, in such cases the government should supply the capital. 
 
The majority of the literature analysing the impact of public investment originates from the 
studies by Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990a, 1990b). Aschauer suggests that an 
expansion of public investment spending should have a major impact on private output. More 
specifically, public investment is thought to increase the rate of return to private capital, 
stimulating private investment expenditure.  Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990a, 1990b) 
both agree that regions with higher levels of public investment tend to experience higher 
output, where private investment and employment growth were assumed to have preceded 
public investment2. An increase in utility-type expenditure leads to a fall in the savings rate 
and in growth; while both tend to rise initially in response to productive government 
expenditure they subsequently decline (Barro, 1990). Other empirical contributions have 
found a null or even a negative effect of public investment. Therefore, the impact of public 
investment is clearly linked to the way investment is allocated among areas. In middle-
income countries like Mexico there is an observed pattern of scattering of funds among a 
large number of small and dispersed regions (Hirschman, 1958). One reason put forward for a 
broad spatial scattering of investment is the government’s endeavour to win political support 
in all regions. Another reason is the belief that economic progress is a force which equally 
affects all regions; governments are depicted as being unprepared and unwilling to take 
decisions about spatial priorities and sequences for investment. Nevertheless, Hirschman’s 
argument leaves the choice of the direction of public investment in the planners’ hands, 
which could imply that it could to a certain extent be manipulated for electoral ends.  
 
First attempts to establish optimal timing for regional allocation of public investment are 
found in Ramah (1963) and Intriligator (1964), who confronted the trade-off between 
national maximisation and regional disparities in living standards. Beyond these findings, 
Okuno and Yagi (1990) examined aspects of public investment that tend to balance inter-
regional income equality and efficiency of the economy as a whole. By including private 
investment in their model, they found that a public investment switch from rural to urban is 
an optimal policy, although this switch is not optimal when private investment is ignored. 
They found that regional income inequality is affected by public investment, but that 
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investment aimed at reducing regional output inequality does not always produce the desired 
effect. In the framework of the new economic geography, Martin and Rogers (1995) and 
Martin (1999) suggest that public infrastructure may play an important role in attracting 
industries from other regions, but in a context in which there are negative effects of industrial 
concentration, improvements of infrastructure should be addressed intra-regionally rather 
than inter-regionally. Otherwise the process of divergence will accelerate.  
 
This study takes these issues further and examines regional disparities according to the 
position of these regions on the income distribution scale and the effect exerted by public 
investment in this process. Evidence that growth does not necessarily reduce inequalities can 
also be found  in Chatterji (1992). Thus, the division between poor and rich regions could 
hypothetically be deepening, even though the aggregate measure for convergence shows a 
process of convergence. All of these problems suggest that additional tests for regional 
disparities should be applied.  
 
3 Empirical model 
 
We depart from the conventional production function ( )itLitGitKFitY ,,=  where Kit is stock 
of capital of the economy, Git refers to public investment and Lit total employed population. 
Assuming constant reruns to scale , the same technology can be represented at a steady state 
as yit = f(kit,git,1), where y =Y/L, k =K/L and g =G/L. The empirical strategy used in this 
study is driven by the analysis of the role of public investment (g) in regional per capita 
income in levels (y), the latter being the dependent variable.  
 
Measuring the effect of public and private investment in developing and transition economies 
where data on capital stocks is not available often implies undertaking some assumptions to 
capture the influence of both public and private. Indeed, in this study for Mexico only the 
flow of public investment (g) was available rather than the stock which in turn was measured 
in per capita terms. However, is common practice in the absence of capital stock to interpret 
that investment as a proxy for total capital.  Yet, in order to deal with a possible simultaneous 
bias between regional per capita GDP and public investment, we introduce several lags in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 The rationale for including public expenditure in the growth equation is that private inputs may not be close 
substitutes for public inputs. 
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variable referring to public investment (referred as g(1) and g(2)). Time lags have been 
introduced to capture potential delays in productivity of public investment, which, 
hypothetically, might differ both between investment types and regions. Two lags were 
finally considered, as further lags were systematically non-statistically significant. However, 
one should bear in mind when interpreting the time lag coefficients in the short-run that they 
might reflect an expenditure effect rather than, as hypothesised, the productive impact of the 
investment. Additionally, a variable for private capital (k) was used in the analysis to take 
into account the hypothetical complementary role of private investment.  As a result, we 
would expect a positive sign for these variables in the income equation, which would suggest 
a potential to reduce the level of income disparities among regions. 
 
According to previous literature, there are certain control variables that should be included 
when estimating regional income determinants. As noted in the theoretical section, we 
include (y0) as a covariate variable referring to the initial per capita GDP in order to capture 
the effects of previous regional income advantage. No fixed were included as far as the initial 
income is already time invariant. effect were included to avoid  although we introduce a set 
of regional dummies as proxies for differences in the steady-state value of per capita income 
such as dummy variables that  isolate the effect of being an oil producer (Oil), a region in the 
(north), or in the (centre) of the country.3 Furthermore, we also include time effects in order 
to control for variables that might have common effects across states in a specific year. As a 
result, the model specified is the following : 
ittitit
itititit
kg
ggcentrenorthoilyy
µλββ
ββββββα
++++
++++++=
−
−
827
16543201    (1) 
 
Where β and δ refer to the parameter for the determinants of regional income, µ denotes the 
error term and λ refers to time effects. 
 
3.1 The quantile regression model 
 
                                                 
3 States included in the dummy variables are as follows: 
OIL: Campeche and Tabasco. 
NORTH: Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sonora and Tamaulipas. 
CENTRE: Distrito Federal (Mexico City), México, Morelos, Puebla, and Querétaro. 
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Equation (1). although informative, provides little information on the effects of public 
investment within groups of regions according to their position in terms of regional income 
distribution. A way of taking this issue a step forward is by employing quantile regression 
analysis, which enables us to distinguish regions according to their position on the income 
distribution scale.  
 
Typically, in ordinary regression models we cannot distinguish whether inequalities appear 
across the entire spectrum of distribution or if they are concentrated around one part of the 
scale. In order to elucidate this issue, we have developed a quantile regression model, based 
on Koenker and Basset (1978), which has been used extensively in labour economics to study 
wage inequalities. We use this method to analyse the effects of public investment on regional 
income and at different points of the income distribution scale. Let  be a 
sample of two main explanatory variables for a given period. The relation between these two 
variables may be formulated as: 
),( itPUBINVity
 
                    iitPUBINVoity 0µβ +=             (2)                   
 
Then the quantile regression can be expressed as: 
 
                θβθ PUBINVitPUBINVityQuant 0)/( =                 (3)           
 
where the Quant denotes the conditional quantile (θ ) of yit, where the conditional 
explanatory variable is public investment  assuming that itPUBINV
0)/( =itoi PUBINVQuant µθ , where µ θi denotes the error term. The estimation results 
 indicate how the conditional expectation of income 
varies as 
PUBINVitPUBINVitytQuan θβˆ)/(ˆ =
θ  increases along the distribution scale. The quantile coefficients therefore 
elucidate on the marginal change in the conditional quantile due to a marginal change in 
PUBINV. 
 
Quantile regression models are similar to ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression models, but 
the conditional expectation of the dependent variable is allowed to vary across its distribution 
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taking any percentile.4 It has the advantage of allowing statistical inferences in much the 
same way as classical regression methods grounded on minimising sums of residuals and 
displays additional properties of invariance and robustness (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). As a 
result, by computing regression quantiles we can go on to estimate whether the effect of 
public investment is more pronounced at different points of the regional income distribution 
scale.  
 
3.2 The data  
 
We use a panel of Mexican regions obtained from public sources for the period 1993–98. The 
period coincides with an ongoing regional integration process that seems to have influenced 
public investment efficiency (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1989, 1995). Data for GDP and public 
investment were gathered from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografia e Informática 
(INEGI)5. To calculate per capita GDP, we use population data from the Population Census 
(also by INEGI), as well as available figures from the statistical annexes of the Presidential 
Address to the Nation. Data on public investment were collected from the same statistical 
annexes as well as INEGI for various years6. We split public investment into social and 
infrastructure investment.7 Data employed have been defined in constant prices using a 
different deflator for each region that was applied to different variables.  
 
As in any standard model of growth, we have included private investment as a separate 
independent variable. Hypothetically, it is supposed to play either a complementary or 
supplementary role to public investment. Since this variable is not available for Mexican 
regions, it has been approximated on the basis of the percentage of private credits each region 
receives. We assume that the share of private investment is not significantly different from 
the share of private credits, and we distribute national gross private formation of capital on 
that basis. Data on the region percentage of private credits were taken from the statistical 
                                                 
4 Any one-dimensional statistics (including the least squares estimator) for estimating a parameter of location 
can be readily extended to the regression context. 
5 National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Information Systems — INEGI webpage, available at 
www.inegi.gob.mx. 
6 Data for population were extracted from the Statistical Annexes of the Presidential Address to the Nation, 
various years, and the INEGI database 
7 Social investment includes central government spending in education, health, labour, urban development, 
sewerage, ecology, solidarity and regional development and social supply programmes. Infrastructure comprises 
investment in communication and transport systems. Total public investment includes social and infrastructure 
investment, plus other investment, such as justice and energy. 
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annexes of the Presidential Address to the Nation. Finally, regional dummies approximate 
differences in steady-state values of per capita income and also absorb fixed regional effects 
in the error term.  
 
4 Regional disparities and the allocation of public investment in Mexico 
 
4.1 Regional disparities and the macroeconomic context 
 
Since the early 1970s Mexico has undertaken a broad range of economic, financial and 
political reforms that have led to a regional policy as it now stands. Throughout the 1970s 
and at the beginning of the 1980s, the country was under a populist government. The motors 
of growth during this period can be traced to public investment. Public investment was 
financed by issuing debt as a result of the high international oil prices — a sector which had 
dominated the economy for many years — which led to a deep economic crisis in 1982 
(Zedillo, 1986). Subsequent economic and political adjustments were directed towards 
correcting the oversized public sector, which implied less intensive public investment 
(Cardenas, 1996).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1  
 
Table 1 provides an initial overview of the evolution of disparities among regions. Regional 
disparities have been measured by the coefficient of variation of per capita GDP over a set of 
geographical areas between 1970 and 1998.  Because the relative size of the population for 
different regions has not varies among the years examined significantly we expect the 
coefficient of variation to be comparable over time. In addition, we present the data for 
specific years in order to avoid repetitive results. In doing so we  have selected those years 
where there was a change in the coefficient of variation.  Results show that disparities in per 
capita GDP dropped during the period from 1970 to 1985. After 1985, Mexico opened up 
trade, which led to an important structural economic change. In particular, the big leap in 
income dispersion between regions occurred between 1985 and 1988. Interestingly, 
inequalities rose significantly in the central and southern regions, although the average 
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remained almost constant. Average disparities during the second half of the 1990s were 
higher than ever before.8 However, inequalities were noticeably different across geographical 
areas. Inequalities between northern states have been the lowest and have displayed a 
downward trend, whereas states in the south display the highest income disparities — 
consistent with other studies such as Juan-Ramon and Rivera-Batiz (1996) .9
 
4.2 Allocation of public investment in Mexico 
 
The allocation of federal investment in Mexican regions has always been centralised. In the 
early 1980s efforts were made to improve transparency in the distribution of public 
investment through the General Sharing Fund, which distributes investment according to 
three criteria: population (based on 1980 estimates); fiscal effort (the share of the federal tax 
revenues); and finally, a per capita percentage of the revenue received in the previous two 
years (both included in 1991). However, within the period analysed, only 20 per cent of the 
total federal revenue was distributed according to this formula, leaving the remainder to 
central government criteria. In addition, the distribution has been significantly uneven, as can 
be noted in Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
When looking at the resulting distribution, Mexico City (known as the Distrito Federal) has 
traditionally taken the lion’s share of public investment. Although during the 1970s and early 
1980s the allocation of public investment was driven by a pragmatic response on the part of 
the government in pursuit of political interests , this situation changed after the liberalisation 
of the economy. The continual decline of public investment followed the new orientation of 
                                                 
8 Despite the economic reforms undertaken for many years, political instability and the interruption of capital 
flows led to a devaluation of the Mexican peso, once again creating a deep economic crisis in the mid-1990s 
(Calvo and Mendoza, 1996; Gil-Díaz and Cartens, 1996). Public finance restrictions were once again reinstated. 
 
9 Migration between states led to a convergence process during the 1970s and early 1980s. This migration 
flowed mainly towards Mexico City. Migration flows then re-directed towards the northern states, which 
displayed more dynamic economies, although inter-state migration did decrease, as flows to the USA became 
more important. See, for example, Chavez-Galindo (1999) and Escobar-Latapi  (1999). Nevertheless, these 
flows have not precluded regional disparities from persisting over time, especially after 1988. In this sense, 
regional inequality may not be strongly affected by migration flows. 
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the economy towards a more private-based sector and a market-driven economy (Lächler and 
Auschauer, 1998).10  
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 General results 
  
Table 3 shows results for equation (1) and the estimates of regression quantiles for equation 
(3) estimated using OLS. Table 4 exhibits results when non-linearities are included in the 
model as discussed further on. Results for panel data models and quantile regressions are 
presented for total, social and infrastructure investment. Quantile categories of income 
distribution read as follows: regions in which income corresponds to the 0.75 quantile are 
named as “high” referring to high income; regions in which income is placed in the median 
(0.5 quantile ) are called “medium”; and finally regions in the 0.25 quantile are called low 
(referring to low income regions). This means that the conditional mean will differ across the 
regional income distribution scale. An additional advantage of using the quantile regression is 
that coefficients are easy to interpret. By subtracting the coefficients of two quantiles, we 
obtain the interquantile variation, revealing how much returns to public investment differ 
according to regional income distribution. The empirical models were estimated using Stata 
7.0 although alternative software is available.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 
 
Now, let us start by examining the impact  of public investment on regional income –so 
called ‘the return to public investment’-, as this is the central issue motivating this paper. To 
do so, we should examine the coefficient of  public investment in both Tables 3 and 4. When 
the impact of public investment is evaluated across the conditional income distribution there 
is a significant contemporaneous - no lags were statistically significant -  positive effect of 
public investment. This pattern applies to all the other income quantiles as well, as shown in 
Table 4, when non-liniarities are included, as explained below. However, as we hypothesise, 
when different sources of public investment are split and their effect examined in isolation, 
                                                 
10 However, there are still claims that public investment has been allocated in a manner that has reinforced 
centralism and authoritarian presidentialism. 
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results were largely heterogeneous. Tables 3 and 4 shows that while contemporaneous 
infrastructure investment was largely significant, social investment did not exert a significant 
effect when evaluated at the mean conditional expectation. Social investment was only 
significant when a two year delay was included, except in the case of the top income quantile 
where the first lag appears to be significant at a ten per cent level. However, these results 
should be interpreted with caution, as the impact of social investment may involve 
identification problems as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Unlike social investment, 
infrastructure investment exerted a significant contemporaneous effect on income when 
evaluated in medium and high income, but not low quantiles. This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that — unlike social investment — the effect of infrastructure investment is 
channelled through reductions in transaction costs (Martin,1999)11 and thus, unlike social 
investment might have exerted an immediate effect on regional income. The immediacy of 
returns to infrastructure investment results from the feature that no significant lags were 
identified.  
 
Returns for private investment (k) are significant and on average, coefficients do not 
significantly change with public investment type. However, they do change when evaluated 
at different points of the income distribution scale. The effect of private investment both 
when evaluated either with social or infrastructure  investment is significant and similar 
coefficients. It was observed that the coefficient was higher when evaluated in low and 
medium quantiles suggesting diminishing returns to scale. Therefore, an inverse effect of 
public and private investment is identified resulting from a hypothetically complementary 
role of both investment sources in Mexico. However, this effect is among the scope of this 
paper and deserves specific examination.  
 
As expected from previous studies, the coefficient for initial per capita GDP (y0) is positive 
and significant in all quantiles, which reveals the existence of some path dependency 
(catching up) in the evolution of regional income. However, the coefficients rise when 
evaluated in higher income quantiles, suggesting a stronger influence of prior income among 
richer regions. The effect of private capital (k) is positive and significant. In addition, the 
                                                 
11 Martin (1999) notes that typically investment is allocated to regions where transaction costs can be reduced 
due to the concentration of industry. Investment in poor regions will thus lead to an increase in prices because of 
dispersion of industry. The potential outcome is a decrease in welfare and greater divergence. However, in the 
future, the fall in prices due to industry concentration will lead to higher overall welfare and benefits for poor 
regions. 
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coefficients for initial per capita GDP (y0) was higher when were where examined at the total 
sample rather than at specific quantiles because quantile regression captures part of the 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
An additional issue is the effect of geographical dummy variables such as location 
(north-centre-south) as well as regions being oil producers. The former variable is 
informative of  possible effects resulting from economic integration where coefficients for 
northern and centre regions along  which are closer to the US frontier were significant and 
indicating a positive effect on the evolution of  economic performance. Conversely, the 
coefficient of oil producing regions turn display a negative coefficient as expected from the 
evolution of oil prices.    
 
5.2 The effect of non-linearities  
 
The estimated impact of public investment might depend on how public investment is 
allocated to a specific region. One way to identify the hypothetically “true relationship” 
might be to introduce dummy variables or an equivalent non-linear relationship. From a 
review of the literature we have found two explanations of the existence of non-linearities in 
public investment. The first was highlighted in Arrow and Kurz (1970) and refers to a 
misallocation of the aggregate capital stock when the marginal product of public capital is 
equal to the marginal product of private capital. The second, noted by Barro (1990) refers to 
the fact that there are diminishing returns in the benefits of public capital, while the costs of 
providing public capital may rise at a constant rate. Consequently, for relatively low levels of 
public capital, an increase in public investment raises the economic growth rate, however, for 
higher levels of public capital an increase in public investment would lead to a decrease in 
growth. 
 
The re-specification of the model did not lead to the removal of any of the variables. 
Following Röller and Waverman (2001) we include two dummies that correspond to medium 
(gmed) and high (ghigh) levels of public investment. The levels were calculated after 
normalisation for the variable g with respect to the arithmetic mean. Medium levels were 
fixed for a value range between 0.8 and 1.2, while high levels were fixed above the value 1.2. 
About 25 per cent of the sample falls within the high category, while approximately 35 per 
cent falls within the medium category. Several alternatives were considered: for instance, an 
 15
increase or decrease in the values for the levels, and confidence intervals were taken, 
including a band of three and four times the standard error. We achieved similar results. 
 
 
The interpretation of results for the levels of medium and high public investment could be as 
follows. If the values of gmed and ghigh are positive, this will signal a critical mass, at which 
public investment is relevant when made at those levels, but which is insignificant at low 
levels. However, if the variable g is positive but gmed and ghigh are negative, there will be 
an endorsement for a diminishing returns hypothesis. 
 
In general, non-linearities — as shown in Table 4 — were significant at the 
conditional mean regression. This had an impact both on elasticities and on the significance 
of some variables. In particular, the dummy variable for the low income group becomes 
significant. The striking aspect of this finding is that in the conditional mean equation (All), 
the ghigh variable is significant but with a negative sign; this might suggest that, on average, 
there are diminishing returns to the use of public investment across states. However, there 
seems to be a critical mass operating in the case of total public investment when evaluated in 
the top regional income quantiles. The implication here is that there may be increasing 
returns to scale for the richer regions. Interestingly, the same result does not apply for social 
and infrastructure investment. Estimates in Table 4 do not support results for increasing 
returns in the high income regions, which might suggest that this finding may be the result of 
the existent heterogeneity of public investment (for example, other forms of public 
investment such as energy might be relevant here). 
  
5.3 Misspecification issues 
 
The estimated models have been corrected by some general estimation tools. We first tested 
the existence of differential variation when regional income varies using a White 
heteroscedasticity test (White, 1980). Results rejected the hypothesis of heterocestaticity at a 
1% critical value. Secondly we tested the existence of multicollinearity employing variance 
inflation factors (VIF) being all smaller than 5 and being the mean VIF was 2.84; and finally 
we identified the existence of serial autocorrelation and corrected it by introducing two lags 
in the dependent variable, as noted earlier. However, specific spatial-related misspecification 
problems might arise (Anselin, 1988). The first potential problem is the existence of spatial 
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autocorrelation resulting from dependence between the position of some observations 
(regions) in the space. That is, whether the spatial distribution of the variables is random or 
shows a pattern of spatial dependence.  The second problem is the existence of spatial 
heterogeneity. Generally speaking, this means that the parameters of the empirical model 
vary in some systematic way across space. We identify a relevant possible type of spatial 
heterogeneity derived from the spatial position of Mexican states.  
 
As noted above, the relevance of spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity compels us 
to undertake some diagnostic tests. We have dealt with the existence of spatial 
autocorrelation here by employing the Moran I test (Cliff and Ord, 1973).  Results do lead to 
a rejection of the null hypothesis of spatial independence of regional income and public 
investment in the space12.   However, we should acknowledge that the Moran’s I test is not 
well tailored to a quantile regression framework. Therefore, if spatial dependence is present 
when variables were evaluated at different quantiles inference should rely on ML estimates 
rather than OLS regression results.  
 
Regarding the existence of spatial heterogeneity due to the agglomeration effects 
associated with the capital, we might expect the existence of some specific spatial distribution 
determined by distance from Mexico City. As explained in the next section, in Table 4 we 
have assumed a different constant term for regions depending on their level of public 
investment. We therefore introduce spatial heterogeneity into the model. Additionally, we 
have undertaken a geographically-weighted regression to tests whether  the distance of each 
region from Mexico City, following an approach similar to McMillen (1996). The hypothesis 
of spatial heterogeneity was rejected using a Likelihood Ratio Test at a usual 5% level. The 
results obtained are consistent with the hypothesis that spatial heterogeneity and spatial 
dependence are often related.  
                                                 
12 The value of the Moran test for the dependant variables regional income and for public investment   was 
respectively  of 1.2 and 0.74. 
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6 Conclusions 
This article has sought to empirically examine the influence of public investment on regional 
income disparities at different points of the regional income distribution scale. This study is 
informative to the geography of development as far as it provides evidence on the 
heterogeneous impact of public investment in shaping economic performance. From a 
methodological standpoint, employing quantile regression has shown some advantages with 
respect to other methods often employed in the past e.g., a pure decomposition of income 
inequality. Therefore, introducing quantile regression in the analysis of disparities seems to 
have offered appealing insights. Indeed, the method allows one to isolate the impact of public 
investment according to the position of each region in the conditional distribution of regional 
income.  
 
A first and most notable finding is that public investment has effectively smoothed over 
regional inequalities in Mexico but mainly among the average and relatively richer regions. 
We find that public investment only has a robust positive impact on rising regional income 
when evaluated at high and medium levels of regional income. Contrary to what might have 
been expected but consistent with Martin (1999), public investment had no relevant effect on 
low-income regions, and in turn on reducing regional inequalities. Arguably, a possible 
interpretation of these findings might be found on the basis of some theoretical frameworks 
of the so-called “new economic geography” (Krugman and Venables, 1995). In the period 
analysed, labour mobility mainly flowed towards the USA rather than within Mexico and, 
thus, following Krugman and Venables (1995), this might lead to the domain of “centripetal” 
forces over “centrifugal forces”. Therefore, economic activity would have concentrated in 
some specific areas, namely the north and the capital of the country, following a sequence 
that resembles a core- periphery model. However, our empirical model does allow the testing 
of such ambitious predictions.  
 
The second finding of our study pints out that the effects on public investment on increasing 
regional income of richer regions is particularly concentrated in infrastructure investment 
rather than social investment. That is, infrastructure investment  allocation has had an 
heterogeneous regional impact on regional inequalities, the pattern being that  public 
investment leads to  richer regions to become similarly richer. These result suggests that 
whereas infrastructure investment has an immediate effect on economic performance by 
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reducing transaction costs Martin (1999), social investment might place its effect in the long 
run. Furthermore, this result reinforces the hypothesis that Mexico is at the first stage of 
Hirschman’s development strategy, if (as we believe) public investment lags do not reveal a 
pure expenditure effect.13 The empirical findings are consistent with the Hirschman (1958) 
framework. The strategy in the allocation of public investment may have followed a set of 
phases whereby Mexico is at a first stage where richer regions where social infrastructure is 
already relatively more develop perform better.  
 
 A third remarkable finding suggests that the effect of public investment, and in particular 
infrastructure investment (when controlling by existing non-linearities) increases across the 
income distribution function – thus, suggesting  ‘increasing returns’ to public investment - . 
The effect of infrastructure investment alone across the regional income distribution suggests 
that investment in richer regions is significantly more effective in rising regional income as 
compared to the rest.  Our findings are potentially consistent with the hypothesis that the 
allocation of public investment in Mexico is directed towards regions that show economic 
agglomeration economies.  
 
  A final collateral finding confirms the importance of the effects resulting from economic 
integration -either due to existing agglomerations, areas with strong natural resource 
endowments and the areas surrounded by rich neighbours - . Evidence of these effects is 
captured through the statistical significance of the coefficients for north-south latitude along 
with those for oil producing regions turned to be significant predictors of the economic 
performance across the regions income distribution.  
  
Other issues remain for future research, such as the question of optimal dynamics of public 
investment allocation and spill-over effects that arise as a result of investment in more 
dynamic regions, often in the top quantile of regional income distribution. Another aspect 
that demands further analysis is the existence of a transition from one group to another within 
the regional income distribution. Furthermore, the future availability of data on the impact of 
the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may permit researchers to test the 
effect of trade liberalisation on the distribution of regional income by incorporating additional 
                                                 
13 The fact that  the coefficient for public investment varies when evaluated at different points of the income 
distribution scale might be interpreted as evidence that expenditure effects are less prominent, as hypothetically 
they should have similar effects across the whole income distribution scale.  
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evidence into the debate. Possible caveats may be solved in future research, such as the extent 
to which the patterns of regional integration modify the impact of public investment on 
economic activity.  
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Table 1. Coefficient of variation of per capita GDP 
 
 
Year 
 
All regions* Centre North South* 
1970 0.41 0.43 0.20 0.39 
1980 0.36 0.41 0.20 0.42 
1985 0.32 0.38 0.18 0.28 
1988 0.41 0.46 0.18 0.47 
1993 0.42 0.51 0.17 0.57 
1998  0.44  0.51  0.16  0.54 
              *Excluding Campeche and Tabasco. 
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Table 2. Allocation of per capita public investment (average=100) 
 
 
State Total Social Infrastructure 
Aguascalientes 73 103 133 
Baja California 47 66 56 
Baja California Sur 142 181 190 
Campeche 700 212 175 
Coahuila 84 86 86 
Colima 90 137 139 
Chiapas 99 120 154 
Chihuahua 45 69 80 
Distrito Federal 230 303 261 
Durango 55 101 69 
Guanajuato 35 52 38 
Guerrero 65 116 68 
Hidalgo 119 108 58 
Jalisco 25 42 35 
México 30 44 70 
Michoacán 37 59 81 
Morelos 49 64 87 
Nayarit 110 119 90 
Nuevo León 55 74 61 
Oaxaca 81 110 239 
Puebla 28 52 57 
Querétaro 66 98 94 
Quintana Roo 90 134 146 
San Luis Potosí 41 67 118 
Sinaloa 62 77 60 
Sonora 72 99 120 
Tabasco 357 91 60 
Tamaulipas 94 69 108 
Tlaxcala 52 126 77 
Veracruz 77 50 61 
Yucatán 60 102 70 
Zacatecas 33 68 61 
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Table 3. Per capita GDP in the Mexican regions, 1993–1998.  
 
 Total Investment Social Investment Infrastructure Investment 
  Income group  Income group  Income group 
Variable          All Low Medium  High All Low Medium  High All Low Medium  High
 g 0.044*** 
(0.0178) 
0.050 
(0.032) 
0.044*** 
(0.014) 
0.046** 
(0.023) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.027) 
-0.0001 
(0.021) 
0.018 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.018* 
(0.011) 
g (1) 0.012 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.029) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.024) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
0.022 
(0.019) 
0.033* 
(0.020) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
g (2) 0.011 
(0.14) 
-0.017 
(0.026) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.023) 
0.044*** 
(0.017) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
y0 0.716*** 
(0.047) 
0.881*** 
(0.047) 
0.891*** 
(0.020) 
0.967*** 
(0.030) 
0.738*** 
(0.047) 
0.833*** 
(0.032) 
0.908*** 
(0.025) 
0.935*** 
(0.029) 
0.763*** 
(0.045) 
0.837*** 
(0.030) 
0.896*** 
(0.024) 
0.939*** 
(0.027) 
k 0.100*** 
(0.0197) 
0.0678*** 
(0.020) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.087*** 
(0.019) 
0.072*** 
(0.014) 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.089*** 
(0.019) 
0.080*** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.010) 
0.020** 
(0.011) 
Oil -0.165*** 
(0.059) 
-0.196*** 
(0.045) 
-0.159*** 
(0.022) 
-0.196*** 
(0.032) 
-0.062 
(0.049) 
-0.130*** 
(0.019) 
-0.094*** 
(0.021) 
-0.103*** 
(0.024) 
-0.059 
(0.048) 
-0.127*** 
(0.023) 
-0.088*** 
(0.021) 
-0.084*** 
(0.027) 
North 0.082*** 
(0.035) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
0.057*** 
(0.013) 
0.062*** 
(0.023) 
0.089*** 
(0.034) 
0.027 
(0.019) 
0.061*** 
(0.017) 
0.096*** 
(0.021) 
0.071** 
(0.032) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.067*** 
(0.015) 
0.070*** 
(0.020) 
Centre 0.049 
(0.034) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
0.032*** 
(0.012) 
0.076*** 
(0.021) 
0.049 
(0.033) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
0.033*** 
(0.016) 
0.070*** 
(0.020) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
0.031*** 
(0.015) 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
1994 0.0096 
(0.015) 
0.025 
(0.028) 
0.011 
(0.14) 
-0.009 
(0.024) 
0.006 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.016 
(0.021) 
0.008 
(0.017) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.022) 
1995 -0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.019 
(0.034) 
-0.039*** 
(0.015) 
-0.086*** 
(0.024) 
-0.049*** 
(0.021) 
-0.055*** 
(0.025) 
-0.076*** 
(0.021) 
-0.111*** 
(0.024) 
-0.043** 
(0.020) 
-0.025 
(0.022) 
-0.072*** 
(0.018) 
-0.120*** 
(0.021) 
1996 -0.076*** 
(0.019) 
-0.088*** 
(0.033) 
-0.105*** 
(0.015) 
-0.128*** 
(0.027) 
-0.096*** 
(0.019) 
-0.120*** 
(0.023) 
-0.118*** 
(0.020) 
-0.133*** 
(0.023) 
-0.097*** 
(0.017) 
-0.077*** 
(0.021) 
-0.121*** 
(0.017) 
-0.154*** 
(0.022) 
1997 -0.099*** 
(0.017) 
-0.125*** 
(0.031) 
-0.138*** 
(0.014) 
-0.134*** 
(0.022) 
-0.105*** 
(0.018) 
-0.120*** 
(0.023) 
-0.140*** 
(0.019) 
-0.143*** 
(0.022) 
-0.117*** 
(0.018) 
-0.105*** 
(0.021) 
-0.151*** 
(0.017) 
-0.158*** 
(0.021) 
1998 -0.091*** 
(0.017) 
-0.120*** 
(0.030) 
-0.113*** 
(0.014) 
-0.123*** 
(0.024) 
-0.094*** 
(0.017) 
-0.105*** 
(0.023) 
-0.130*** 
(0.018) 
-0.127*** 
(0.021) 
-0.108*** 
(0.017) 
-0.100*** 
(0.019) 
-0.135*** 
(0.017) 
-0.156*** 
(0.022) 
Constant -0.300** 
(0.132) 
-0.299*** 
(0.109) 
-0.063 
(0.055) 
-0.037 
(0.084) 
-0.183 
(0.124) 
-0.211*** 
(0.077) 
-0.046 
(0.069) 
-0.004 
(0.066) 
-0.084 
(0.102) 
-0.246*** 
(0.067) 
-0.055 
(0.057) 
0.019 
(0.070) 
 R2 0.9667            0.8413 0.8552 0.8491 0.9696 0.8427 0.8564 0.8533 0.9688 0.8438 0.8564 0.8509
  N=192     Standard errors in parent.  
 * Significant at 10% ** Significant at a 5%. ***Significant at 1% 
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Table 4.Per capita GDP in the Mexican regions, 1993-1998. Nonlinearities included. 
 
 Total Investment Social Investment Infrastructure Investment 
  Income group  Income group  Income group 
Variable          All Low Medium  High All Low Medium  High All Low Medium  High
 g 0.048*** 
(0.018) 
0.051 
(0.034) 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
0.044*** 
(0.018) 
0.039 
(0.025) 
0.029 
(0.034) 
0.021 
(0.035) 
0.037 
(0.032) 
0.040*** 
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.038*** 
(0.014) 
0.044*** 
(0.016) 
g (1) 0.015 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.022 
(0.018) 
0.012 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.025) 
0.033* 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
g (2) 0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
0.046*** 
(0.017) 
0.033 
(0.026) 
0.028 
(0.024) 
0.001 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
y0 0.751*** 
(0.047) 
0.876*** 
(0.038) 
0.898*** 
(0.021) 
0.958*** 
(0.024) 
0.746*** 
(0.048) 
0.839*** 
(0.043) 
0.902*** 
(0.034) 
0.947*** 
(0.029) 
0.773*** 
(0.047) 
0.842*** 
(0.038) 
0.902*** 
(0.021) 
0.947*** 
(0.027) 
k 0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.068*** 
(0.015) 
0.037*** 
(0.008) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.082*** 
(0.019) 
0.067*** 
(0.018) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
0.087*** 
(0.019) 
0.075*** 
(0.016) 
0.042*** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.009) 
Oil -0.200*** 
(0.059) 
-0.180*** 
(0.036) 
-0.151*** 
(0.025) 
-0.170*** 
(0.029) 
-0.071 
(0.051) 
-0.106*** 
(0.033) 
-0.105*** 
(0.031) 
-0.118*** 
(0.024) 
-0.062 
(0.049) 
-0.134*** 
(0.029) 
-0.097*** 
(0.019) 
-0.091*** 
(0.025) 
North 0.058* 
(0.035) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.055*** 
(0.014) 
0.064*** 
(0.018) 
0.072** 
(0.035) 
0.042 
(0.027) 
0.058*** 
(0.023) 
0.068*** 
(0.021) 
0.068** 
(0.033) 
0.028 
(0.021) 
0.056*** 
(0.013) 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
Centre 0.037 
(0.033) 
-0.020 
(0.019) 
0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.076*** 
(0.015) 
0.039 
(0.034) 
0.008 
(0.022) 
0.040** 
(0.021) 
0.070*** 
(0.020) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
-0.015 
(0.021) 
0.029 
(0.012) 
0.069*** 
(0.016) 
1994 0.006 
(0.015) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
1995 -0.016 
(0.020) 
-0.019 
(0.025) 
-0.044*** 
(0.016) 
-0.079*** 
(0.018) 
-0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.055* 
(0.030) 
-0.069*** 
(0.027) 
-0.088*** 
(0.023) 
-0.039** 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.028) 
-0.067*** 
(0.016) 
-0.114*** 
(0.019) 
1996 -0.073*** 
(0.018) 
-0.087*** 
(0.025) 
-0.106*** 
(0.015) 
-0.127*** 
(0.020) 
-0.080*** 
(0.019) 
-0.087*** 
(0.031) 
-0.107*** 
(0.026) 
-0.125*** 
(0.024) 
-0.097*** 
(0.017) 
-0.080*** 
(0.025) 
-0.121*** 
(0.014) 
-0.152*** 
(0.018) 
1997 -0.097*** 
(0.017) 
-0.121*** 
(0.024) 
-0.141*** 
(0.014) 
-0.133*** 
(0.017) 
-0.089*** 
(0.018) 
-0.104*** 
(0.029) 
-0.115*** 
(0.025) 
-0.128*** 
(0.023) 
-0.116*** 
(0.018) 
-0.097*** 
(0.026) 
-0.143*** 
(0.015) 
-0.152*** 
(0.018) 
1998 -0.091*** 
(0.016) 
-0.114*** 
(0.023) 
-0.116*** 
(0.014) 
-0.144*** 
(0.019) 
-0.082*** 
(0.017) 
-0.100*** 
(0.027) 
-0.113*** 
(0.025) 
-0.116*** 
(0.023) 
-0.108*** 
(0.017) 
-0.097*** 
(0.024) 
-0.131*** 
(0.014) 
-0.149*** 
(0.018) 
Gmed -0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.037*** 
(0.013) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.041 
(0.024) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.021) 
-0.024 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.022) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
ghigh -0.046** 
(0.020) 
-0.003 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.073*** 
(0.026) 
-0.038 
(0.039) 
-0.037 
(0.035) 
-0.042 
(0.036) 
-0.049** 
(0.026) 
-0.016 
(0.034) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
-0.037 
(0.027) 
Constant -0.388*** 
(0.133) 
-0.304*** 
(0.100) 
-0.050 
(0.065) 
-0.038 
(0.076) 
-0.389*** 
(0.146) 
-0.353*** 
(0.139) 
-0.147 
(0.138) 
-0.179 
(0.119) 
-0.167 
(0.113) 
-0.228** 
(0.109) 
-0.120** 
(0.064) 
-0.032 
(0.077) 
 R2 0.9665            0.8427 0.8554 0.8524 0.9691 0.8442 0.8576 0.8567 0.9694 0.8451 0.8571 0.8532
  N=192     Standard errors in parent.  
Significant at 10% ** Significant at a 5%. ***Significant at 1% 
 27
A1. Geographical distribution of Mexican states 
 
NORTH 
Baja California 
Coahuila  
Chihuahua 
Nuevo Leon 
Sonora 
Tamaulipas 
 
 
 
 
15 % Population 1971 
15% Population 1999 
      
CAPITAL 
Distrito Federal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 % Population 1971 
9 % Population 1999 
 
CENTRE 
Mexico 
Morelos 
Puebla 
Queretaro  
Michoacan 
Guanajuato 
Hidalgo 
Tlaxcala 
Veracruz 
 
37 % Population 1971 
42 % Population 1999 
 
SOUTH 
Chiapas 
Guerrero 
Oaxaca 
Quintana Roo 
Yucatan 
 
 
 
 
 
13 % Population 1971 
14% Population 1999 
 
 
 
CENTRE-NORTH 
Aguascalientes 
Baja California Sur 
Colima 
Durango 
Jalisco 
Nayarit 
San Luis Potosi 
Sinaloa 
Zacatecas 
 
19 % Population 1971 
18 % Population 1999 
 
 
 
OIL 
Campeche 
Tabasco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 % Population 1971 
3 % Population 1999 
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